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benefits. However, Malawi's depend- 
ence on the international dono;com- 
munity leaves it with little choice but 
to reallocate scarce resources to assist 
the Mozambican refugees. Clearly, the 
UN and other international bodies 
have not been fair in providing eco- 
nomic compensation for the asylum 
offered to one million Mozambican 
refugees. 
Notes 
1. Malawi Daily Times, Nov. 23, 1990 and 
March 27,1991. 
2. Ibid., December 23,1992. 
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An Environmental Argument Against 
Mozambican Refugee Camps in Malawi 
Ian Smith 
Introduction 
There is a fundamental contradiction 
within humanitarian relief offered to 
refugee populations. Intervenors si- 
multaneously pursue two opposing 
objectives: to protect and assist refu- 
gees. "Protection," as practiced for 
long-term refugee populations, gener- 
ally means the activities of "care and 
maintenanceu-the distribution of 
food, blankets and other relief items, 
the establishment of schools, health 
clinics, boreholes, the siting of refugee 
camps-in short, controlling all as- 
pects of refugee lives. "Assistance," in 
contrast, implies human and economic 
development, maintaining a degree of 
social continuity between the former 
and present lives of refugees, facilitat- 
ing economic and social integration 
within the host community-ulti- 
mately the restoration of refugee con- 
trol over their own lives. 
This paper explores the contradic- 
tion between controlling and protect- 
ing refugees versus truly assisting 
them by facilitating integration within 
the host population. In the case of the 
Mozambican refugees in Malawi, the 
refugees' loss of control over their lives 
and livelihoods through encampment 
and restrictions on their economic 
activities, virtually eliminated earlier 
indigenous attempts to integrate them 
within the local p opulation. Without 
adequate material assistance, or the 
means to get it, marginalized and 
powerless refugees were forced into 
dangerous, exploitative and environ- 
mentally destructive survival strate- 
gies in order to increase their 
purchasing power. 
Ian Smith from the Faculty of Environmental 
Studies is a research associate at CRS, York 
University. 
Priorities of International Relief 
In the business of refugee assistance, 
the priorities of protection and short- 
term humanitarian relief have sup- 
planted true assistance and long-term 
development. The local integration of 
refugees is considered a luxury, an 
ideal situation which is rarely pursued 
by the UN and sister agencies. More 
often, the responsibility of pursuing 
refugee "development" is delegated to 
NGOs who have neither the funds, 
mandate, or experience to work out- 
side of refugee camps. Numerous 
studies have shown that the bureau- 
cratic and financial structure of aid 
agencies predisposes them to ad hoc 
emergency responses (Keen 1992:58). 
Longer term development initiatives 
in hosting countries often do not pro- 
vide immediate or tangible results in 
the eyes of funding agencies. 
Most refugees in sub-Saharan Af- 
rica are from an agrarian background. 
Despite this fact, refugees are rarely 
encouraged or even permitted to inte- 
grate into the local agricultural com- 
munities. Camps or settlements are 
favoured over local integration due to 
political expediency, a need to control 
and account for aid inputs, perceived 
land shortages, or an incurable desire 
on the part of aid agencies to create 
"grand social experiments" (Harrell- 
Bond 1986). Host governments remain 
reluctant to encourage integration, 
fearing permanent settlement and fur- 
ther strain on already overstretched 
social services. Experience clearly 
shows, however, that most refugees 
repatriate at the first opportunity, even 
in the face of continued insecurity and 
personal risk (Cuny et al. 1992). 
Protection and Refugee Restriction 
The establishment of refugee camps 
serves two purposes: first, to facilitate 
the allocation of emergency assistance; 
- - - -- - - - - 
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and second, to legitimize the raison 
d'Ctre of aid agencies-the perceived 
need to segregate, label and restrict 
refugee movement (Zetter 1991). The 
second factor arises out of the agen- 
cies' need to account for assistance, 
which necessitates exerting a degree of 
control over refugee lives. Accounting 
for food and other material aid distrib- 
uted is much easier in a centralized 
population, than it is in a "population 
which is 'mixed up with the local com- 
munity'" (Harrell-Bond 1986:8). How- 
ever, accountability and control are 
fundamentally at odds with the stated 
objective of UNHCR to "foster the self- 
reliance of the refugees," in which the 
"establishment of refugee camps must 
be only a last resort" (UNHCR 
1982:57). 
Attempts to control refugees and ac- 
count for aid inputs cause humanitar- 
ian agencies to "fabricate inherently 
inaccurate numbers" of refugee popu- 
lation in order to satisfy donors and 
host governments that relief is only 
reaching the intended beneficiaries 
(Harrell-Bond et al. 1991).' The func- 
tional objective of aid agencies thus 
becomes the harmonization of relief 
distribution with social control over 
refugee populations. 
Apart from controlling refugee 
lives, camps, it is frequently argued, 
decrease pressures on the host envi- 
ronment, economy, and agricultural 
land (UNHCR 1991; 1992). This is 
based on the assumptions that refugee 
needs can be adequately met by relief 
inputs distributed within the confines 
of a refugee camp, and that refugees 
can be effectively segregated from the 
local society. However, repeatedly we 
find that aid, particularly food aid, is 
insufficient and often nutritionally and 
culturally inappropriate (Keen 1992:6- 
15). Refugees have to engage in vari- 
ous economic activities to meet basic 
food and shelter needs. Paradoxically, 
a refugee camp is the last place a refu- 
gee could expect to earn a traditional 
source of income. Cut off from market 
opportunities with the local popula- 
tion and without land to cultivate, the 
economic opportunities become very 
limited indeed. 
Inaddition refugee camps are a total 
disruption in social continuity for refu- 
gees. Refugees are denied access to 
land for cultivation and have limited 
access to the biophysical environment 
as a possible source of food, fuel, fod- 
der, construction materials, income, 
medicine, livelihood, etc. 
Marginality, Environment and 
Refugees 
When considered in terms of re- 
sources, African refugee migration be- 
comes 
... a process involving a continuous 
reduction in the level of control 
which a social class, fraction, cat- 
egory or stratum exercises over the 
biophysical and inter-human envi- 
ronments in relation to others 
(Ibeanu 1990:51). 
Thus, restrictions on the movement of 
refugees and the collection of re- 
sources is a continuation of the process 
of disempowerment which led to their 
initial displacement. The end result of 
this segregation is often a two-tiered 
society in which refugees and local 
residents live in the same area, share 
the same culture and values, and yet 
have an entirely different set of rights 
and social freedoms. Fundamental to 
the independence and livelihood of 
refugees from an agrarian background 
is regaining a measure of control over 
the biophysical resource base. Yet aid 
agencies and host governments sys- 
tematically reduce or eliminate refu- 
gee access to the "environment" by 
restricting them to camps. 
The increased pressure on the envi- 
ronment surrounding a refugee camp 
further divides the host and refugee 
population by creating local shortages 
which lead to privatisation of re- 
sources normally collected freely, such 
as wild foods, firewood, and construc- 
tion materials for houses, etc. (Wilson 
1989:65). Refugee camps themselves 
are often established in open access 
areas such as communal forests. The 
clearing of these lands creates addi- 
tional resource shortages and impov- 
erishes the poorer segment of the local 
population who rely on these common 
property resources (CPRs) as a source 
of income and household needs 
(Chambers 1986). It is therefore a com- 
mon strategy of local population to 
restrict refugee access to common ar- 
eas or to charge collection fees to com- 
pensate for lost resources (Christensen 
1982; Chambers 1986; Wilson 1989). 
Amid this reality, refugees struggle 
by any means at their disposal to in- 
crease their independence from formal 
assistance. Refugees often sell or trade 
material assistance in order to increase 
their range of economic options. They 
enter into insecure agreements with 
the local population permitting them 
to cultivate land. They migrate to ur- 
ban areas or estates seeking wage em- 
ployment. Refugees engage in illicit 
and environmentally-destructive 
practices such as deforestation or char- 
coal manufacture in order to earn a 
livelihood. Fundamentally, they avoid 
refugee camps except as a last resort, 
when they are unable to rely on the 
assistance of friends or relatives, or are 
unable to gain secure access to land 
(Hansen 1979). All of these survival 
strategies are discouraged or banned 
outright by either host governments or 
aid agencies. It is this institutional con- 
trol over refugees which has led to 
their insecure livelihoods, resulting in 
environmentally unsustainable activi- 
ties. 
Refugees in Malawi 
As a pawn of South Africa, Hastings 
Banda's Malawi actively supported 
the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) in the late 1970s and early 
1980s as part of South Africa's "total 
strategy" to destabilise the Front Line 
States and increase regional depend- 
ence on the South African economy 
(Hedges 1987). Pressure from the Front 
Line States caused a partial reversal of 
Malawi policy towards RENAMO and 
the expulsion of 12,000 RENAMO 
troops from Malawi territory in Sep- 
tember 1986. The resulting wave of 
RENAMO terrorism precipitated the 
first major influx of refugees into Ma- 
lawi. By the end of 1986, an estimated 
120,0002 Mozambican refugees had 
fled to Nsanje district of Malawi- 
greater than the local population-and 
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their numbers continued to rise until 
they reached their present lwel of over 
300,0003. 
At the time of this research in July 
1992, two-thirds of the refugees were 
in camps. Eighty-nine refugee house- 
holds in both refugee camps and "inte- 
grated areas" were interviewed on the 
efficacy of the aid program and access 
to the local land and forest resources. 
Indigenous Assistance 
Despite the much-heralded land short- 
ages in Malawi (the main rationale for 
the establishment of refugee camps) 
after five years of organized assistance, 
as many as 100,000 refugees, or one 
third of the refugees in Nsanje district, 
have avoided camps and remained in 
self-settled areas-primarily in 
Malawian villages along the Shire 
River or in villages along the hilly bor- 
der of Mozambique. Judging from the 
finding that 44 percent of refugee 
households arrived in Malawi prior to 
the initiation of formal assistance in 
1987-the local population was able to 
assist andintegrate the refugees tosome 
extent well before the establishment of 
a relief program. 
Flg.1: UNHCR Flold Prosonce In Southoastorn Atrlcr (oouro*: UNHCR) 
With the e&ablisbent of the first 
refugee camps in 1987 by the Malawi 
Government and subsequent camps in 
1988 by UNHCR, iridigenous assist- 
ance was replaced. Of those refugees 
arriving prior to 1987,31 percent were 
able to gain access to land and avoid 
eventual settlement im refugee camps. 
However, only 11 pedcent who arrived 
in 1987 or later weze able to do so. 
Arguably, there was not enough avail- 
able land to settle refugees outside of 
camps. 
However, the fact that refugees re- 
ported receiving plotls of land as late as 
1992 would suggest that it was not a 
question of land shartages but rather 
the formal establishment of camps and 
external assistance which discouraged 
the local population from helping the 
refugees. In other words, when the 
government and UNHCR relieved the 
local population of their traditional 
obligation to assist the refugees, they 
did not. 
It is often forgotten, or perhaps ig- 
nored, that Mozambican flight into 
southern Malawi has been occurring 
more or less continuously since the 
1860s (Vail and White 1980; Vail1983; 
Mandala 1990). Much of this immigra- 
tion has been of a temporary nature, 
precipitated by famines and land al- 
ienation resulting frdm the slave trade, 
Portuguese policies of chibalo (forced 
labour), the independence struggle of 
the 1960s and 1970% and the Rhode- 
sia/South Africa supported RENAMO 
destabilization from 1978 onwards. 
Throughout these immigrations, refu- 
gee survival was assured by their inte- 
gration within the local agricultural 
economy. Refugees either worked as 
sharecroppers or as wage labourers on 
estates and smallholder farms during 
seasonal labour shbrtages (Mandala 
1990). Common kinship and family 
ties allowed access td the extensive and 
fertile dambo (marshes) along the Shire 
River. 
Historically, and as recently as 1992, 
these dumbo lands have ensured the 
survival of both refugees and the local 
population during periods of regional 
instability by supplementing house- 
hold food production. 
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Lack of Awarendss of Assistance 
Programs 
The traditional ~ractice of expanding 
dimba agricultuae during periods of 
regional food hsecurity was largely 
unknown to the NGOs and UN agen- 
cies. Indeed, it remained a mystery to 
various aid agencies just how the local 
and refugee populations were surviv- 
ing in the Lower Shire Valley despite 
the total failure Of the 1991192 maize 
crop. 
Relief agencies typically had staff 
shortages with Umited opportunities 
(and inclination) to "visit the field as 
they were based in urban centres far 
from refugee hosting areas. Local agri- 
cultural systems remained poorly un- 
derstood by intervenors, and aid 
agencies relied an what one UNHCR 
field officer des@ibed as the "black- 
box principle." 
I know how much food is going in [to 
refugee  camps]^, but I don't know 
how much is actually being con- 
sumed or how much is needed. I rely 
on the number of cases of malnour- 
ished children at the intensive feed- 
ing centres. 
The "black box" approach gave the 
perception t h t  food aid was adequate 
in Nsanje district, although the scale of 
economic activity by refugees in order 
to purchase food suggested otherwise. 
Ninety-five percent of refugee house- 
holds engaged in income-generating 
activities-spenging on average 70 
percent of earned income on 
food.Food surveys by the French 
NGO, Md&cins Sans Frontibes (MSF), 
indicated that in the first half of 1992, 
refugees received only 84 percent of 
the 2,000 calories recommended (and 
supposedly supplied) by the World 
Food Program (WFP). Eighteen per- 
cent of refugee households sold or 
traded as much as one-third of their 
food ration with the local population 
and other refugees to purchase more 
pressing necessities like firewood, 
soap, fresh vegetables and small 
amounts of animal protein. In addi- 
tion, for various measons, 34 percent of 
refugee households did not receive 
even this small amount of food. Refu- 
gee survival was due in no small part 
to their own initiative and assistance 
from the local population. 
Parallel Economies 
The inability, or unwillingness, of the 
aid program to integrate the refugees 
into the local population had a more 
disturbing implication-the develop- 
ment of a parallel economy, outside of 
the traditional subsistence one, based 
on the collection of firewood and other 
natural resources, the sale of food aid, 
wage labour, beer brewing and other 
marginal income-generating activi- 
ties. In all, over 90 percent of refugee 
households earned an income through 
economic activities other than NGO- 
sponsored projects or subsistence agri- 
culture. This parallel economy extended 
into Mozambique-ultimately ben- 
efiting RENAMO and strengthening 
their political and financial base. The 
extent to which RENAMO was able to 
control an extensive and sizeable bor- 
der economy based on agriculture, re- 
source collection, and diversion of 
food aid raises troubling questions 
about the efficacy of food aid and refu- 
gee camps as a surrogate to economic 
development and local integration. 
In one particular camp, Tengani, 
RENAMO could be seen openly ferry- 
ing refugees and local Malawians 
across the Shire River. Some of them 
remainedin the refugee camps and col- 
lected rations, without fear of detec- 
tion or harassment from camp 
administrators or relief staff in Ma- 
lawi. Not only did RENAMO have the 
freedom to move within Malawi, they 
also controlled the distribution of the 
valuable dambo land in Mozambique 
and taxed all food produced, resources 
collected and land rented in Mozam- 
bique. They also controlled the consid- 
erable volume of border traffi& across 
the Shire River through a series of 
check points. 
Refugee Survival Strategies and 
Environmental Degradation 
The de facto exclusion of refugees from 
legitimate access to the environment 
prevented them from investing scarce 
capital or energy into managing those 
resources and contributed to environ- 
mentally-destructive practices such as 
uncontrolled deforestation in hilly ar- 
eas, absence of fallowing, and removal 
of roots and tree stumps as a source of 
firewood. Not surprisingly, refugees 
showed no inclination towards plant- 
ing trees in communal areas where 
ownership could not be a~sured.~  In- 
terestingly, the majority of refugee 
households had however, recently 
planted trees around their  house^.^ 
Clearly, the objectives of development 
and sustainable management are at 
odds with those of protection and con- 
trol. 
The poorest third of refugee house- 
holds, i.e., those who did not have ac- 
cess to land for cultivation and did not 
receive adequate food rations, were 
most likely earn an income from the 
collection of firewood, bamboo, 
thatching, or wild foods from open 
access areas. In all, 42 percent of this 
group collected forest resources as 
their main source of income (see Table 
1). Arguably, collecting resources was 
the most undesirable and insecure 
sources of income as it often involved 
a high degree of mobility, low returns 
on labour, and travel in insecure bor- 
der areas. The privatisation of resource 
collection by the host population in 
Malawi and RENAMO in Mozam- 
bique further exposed refugees to ex- 
ploitation and created an additional 
financial burden. Many of these re- 
sources were collected in Mozam- 
bique. Seventeen percent of all fuel 
wood in the refugee hosting areas of 
Nsanje district came from Mozam- 
bique (Smith 1993:93). Overall, the lack 
of economic opportunity in refugee 
camps and the insufficiency of food 
aid led many refugee households to 
rely on deforestation and insecure live- 
lihoods in order to survive. 
The richest third of the refugee 
households, i.e., those who generally 
had access to land andlor ample food 
rations, were the least likely to rely on 
firewood collection (only 16 percent 
reported it as their main source of in- 
come) and were much more active in 
more socially acceptable and profit- 
able economic activities such as repair 
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industries, fishing, farming, etc. (see 
Table 1). They were able to convert 
food aid and marketed agricultural 
produce into capital investment. Inter- 
estingly, they were also more likely to 
engage in wage labour for the local 
population at higher wages than 
poorer groups. This would suggest 
that they were more "integrated" with 
the local population and were less sub- 
ject to exploitation. Nineteen percent 
of refugee households located in 
Malawian villages relied mainly on 
wage labour as a source of income, 
compared to only 8 percent of camp 
refugees (Smith 1993:93). 
Refugee-Host Conflict Over 
Resources 
The official segregation of refugees 
through a protection policy based on 
encampment and isolation would lead 
to conflict between refugees and hosts 
over resources. Refugees often could 
not gain access to common areas since 
the local population restricted access. 
In fact, many refugee camps were situ- 
ated on former common areas pre- 
cisely because "no one owned the 
land." Wilson (1989) reported that the 
local population often charged for the 
collection of various edible plants 
which were formerly collected freely. 
This privatization of common prop- 
erty resources and controlled access to 
these areas and resources by the local 
population reduced the opportunity 
for local integration and more gener- 
ally, economic development among 
the refugees. 
The forested hills of the Kirk Range, 
formerly open access forests, were pa- 
trolled by both the Malawi Forest De- 
partment and villagers who routinely 
harassed refugees attempting to col- 
lect wood. Refugees were forced to pay 
up to MK 2.00 as "collection tax," al- 
though the official user fee for govern- 
ment forest reserves was MK 0.30. 
These taxes were often collected out- 
side of the government reserves by 
Malawian villagers. Growing numbers 
of refugees claimed that as a result, 
they collected wood in Mozambique, 
preferring to pay a tax of "two or three 
sticks of wood" to RENAMO, and a 
transportation fee across the Shire 
River, rather than the high collection 
fees in Malawi. 
The fact that it was officially illegal 
to transfer land to refugees for cultiva- 
tion made them especially vulnerable 
when they entered into tenant agree- 
ments with the local population. The 
increased privatisation of temporary 
land transfers was exemplified by the 
finding that 58 percent of refugee 
households with land were paying 
rent or sharecropping (Smith 1993:76), 
a practice almost unheard of in Ma- 
lawi? Many of the refugees reported 
that they had land reclaimed by the 
original owners after cultivation or just 
prior to harvest. Wilson had similar 
findings (1989:73). Without legal title 
to the land, refugees had no claim to 
recourse. In fact, refugees generally 
had more secure access to land by cul- 
tivating inside the Mozambique bor- 
der with the consent of RENAMO. In 
all, 9 percent of refugee households in 
Nsanje district cultivated land in 
RENAMO-controlled territory in Mo- 
zambique, and 15 percent cultivated in 
Malawi (Smith 1993:77). Seventy-six 
percent of households had no access to 
land. Although cultivating in 
RENAMO-controlled territory was 
potentially dangerous, and incurred 
considerable expenses (5 to 15 percent 
of harvest was paid to RENAMO in 
addition to transport fees across the 
Shire River), for many, it was prefer- 
able to the insecurity of land tenure in 
Malawi. 
Ultimately segregation from the 
host population minimized the possi- 
bility of even partial membership in 
the host community, often in spite of 
common kinship and a tradition of lo- 
cal assistance to refugees. In Nsanje, 
tension and conflict with the local 
population over resources led to the 
privatization of common property re- 
sources and increased land renting. 
Only refugee households with surplus 
food rations which could be converted 
to capital for investment or those with 
access to productive land were able to 
attain a degree of local integration. 
What Can be Done? 
It is difficult to make recommenda- 
tions for the program in Malawi at this 
late stage, however, some general rec- 
ommendations should be made. First, 
and most important, refugee relief, as 
administered by the UNHCR and sis- 
ter organizations, must abandon the 
refugee camp as a structure for admin- 
istering relief and controlling refugee 
lives. A more integrated population 
would result in mitigated impact on 
the local resource base and increased 
economic integration with the local 
population, which in turn would have 
facilitated social integration. 
Second, relief agencies and host 
governments have to accept the fact 
that controlling refugee population 
necessarily means segregating them, 
excluding them from local member- 
ship, and reducing their options for 
economic survival. An impoverished, 
marginalized population with no ac- 
cess rights to the host environment 
cannot and will not invest in managing 
that environment. If aid agencies and 
host governments are serious about 
assisting refugees and ameliorating lo- 
cal impacts they must seekintegration 
as a medium-term solution. 
Third, the rudiments of an indig- 
enous relief structure often are estab- 
Table 1. Main source of household income for surveyed refugees 
(in percent, Nsanje, 1992 ) 
Main source of income Poorest-third Middle-third Richest-third 
Resource collection (no capital) 42 24 16 
Cottage industries (low capital)' 12 8 4 
Cottage industries (high ~api ta l )~  4 36 40 
Wage labour 12 4 16 
Other 30 28 24 
Total percent 100 100 100 
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lished prior to the intervention of in- 
ternational relief agencies. Indigenous 
assistance is more environmentally 
sustainable and allows greater local 
integration of the refugee population. 
In light of the large size of some refu- 
gee populations, it is preferable to sub- 
sidize indigenous relief efforts, rather 
than replace them with costly and 
destructive refugee camps and adrnin- 
istrative struct~res.'~ In Malawi, en- 
couraging the local population to 
supply small garden plots for refugees, 
combined with material assistance for 
refugees, would allow capital accumu- 
lation, economic integration, less 
reliance on environmental destruction 
and a better diet for refugees. In return, 
the local population would receive 
labour and/or food from the refugees 
and common areas would be 
preserved. 
Finally, a willingness by the 
UNHCR and UNDP to recognize the 
primacy of the environment and forest 
resources as a source of livelihood and 
a determinant of refugee welfare, 
would allow greater investment in en- 
vironmentally sound refugee aid and 
development. Existing programs focus 
on reducing the demand for natural 
resources rather than critically exam- 
ining the socio-economic processes 
causing unsustainable resource 
management." 
It is essential that aid agencies and 
host governments reconsider local in- 
tegration in the medium-term. The 
segregation of refugees from the local 
population, through the establishment 
of camps and the restriction of their 
economic activities, has entrenched 
their marginality and exacerbated the 
unsustainable use of the environment. 
Rather than facilitating the integration 
of the refugees, "protection" as care 
and maintenance has marginalized 
them-resulting in environmental 
degradation, exploitation by the local 
population and empowerment of 
RENAMO. 
Notes 
1. Some of the philosophical contradictions 
within "charity" as practiced by interna- 
tional relief are explored in Hunll-Bond 
(1992). 
Smith 199369. Official sources did not pub- 
lish numbers until 1987--at that time esti- 
mating 158,300. 
As of August 7,1993, according to offidal 
UNHCRI WFPIGovmunentof Malawi fig- 
ures. 
Estimated at 2,000 people per day-pre- 
dominately refugees, but also a significant 
number of poorer Malawians (Smith 
1993:81). 
Similarly, in Zambia, it was found that 
Mozambican refugees invested much less 
in managing planted trees than did the local 
population (Spitteler 1993). 
The trees mot  often selected were fruit and 
multipurpose trees such as neem and 
sangowa, which provided food, fodder, tra- 
ditional medicine and shade. In contrast, 
UNDPIUNHCR sponsored afforestation 
schemes concentrate on euculwtus, which 
although fast growing, h a s l i m k  uses and 
is ecolonically destructive. 
.. - 
These include economic activities with 
minimal capital investment (below US$2.50 
per month) such as hoe-making, shoe re- 
pair, butchering, and "donut" making. 
Capital investment is US$2.50 to US$10.00 
per month. Includes tailoring, bicyclelsew- 
ing machine1 radio repair, aaft making, 
beer brewing, fishing. 
A survey in 1965 showed that only 4percent 
of the Malawian population in the southern 
region rented land (Pryor 1990:405). 
10. For instance, in Swdand,  Mozambican 
refugees were taken in by Swazi villagers 
along the border. In exchange for some land 
and material assistance, refugees provided 
their hosts with labour and shared their 
food rationswith them. After four years, the 
UNHCR dedded to withhold rations from 
refugees not in camps. This led to the im- 
poverishment of the refugees, and a reluc- 
tance by the local population to offer further 
assistance (RPN 1991). 
11. The obsession with distributing fuel-effi- 
dent wood-stoves to refugees, for example, 
does not address the inadequacy of material 
aid to refugees or their marginalization, 
both of which contribute to uncontrolled 
deforestation. In fact, the introduction of 
woodstoves has not had any impact on de- 
forestation around refugee camps. 
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